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13 September 1963.3(h)(2)

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Copy No. C 74

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN




DOCUMENT NO. 11
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☒
☐ DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S O
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010
AUTH: HR 10-2

DATE: _____ REVIEWER:

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


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13 SEPTEMBER 1960

~~TOP SECRET~~**I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC**

Soviet ambassador reported en route back to Iran after nine-month absence; Moscow may hope to capitalize on new Iranian premier's intent to improve relations with USSR.

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Bourguiba apparently adopting more permissive attitude toward Algerian FLN activity in Tunisia; reportedly has agreed to let any "volunteers" for Algerian fighting transit Tunisia.

Situation in the Congo.

Situation in Laos.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

13 September 1960

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR-Iran: Soviet Ambassador Pegov now is en route back to Tehran.

The USSR's decision to return Pegov after his "diplomatic" absence of about nine months indicates that it is seeking to capitalize on new Iranian Premier Sharif Emami's intention--explicitly stated to the US ambassador and possibly to the Soviet chargé in Tehran--to improve relations with the USSR. The USSR presumably plans new efforts to induce Iran, in exchange for "normal" relations, to give guarantees which would have the effect of weakening its political and military ties with the West. Radio Moscow halted its propaganda attacks on the Shah on 31 August (although some clandestine radio attacks continue), and the Soviet press has expressed optimism that the new Iranian Government will modify Tehran's policy toward the bloc.

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Tunisia-Algeria: President Bourguiba, whose restrictions on Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) activity in Tunisia have hampered rebel operations in Algeria, appears to be adopting a more permissive attitude toward the FLN. His recent public speeches indicate a change in attitude, and he reportedly now has agreed to permit "volunteers" for the Algerian fighting, including any that might be sent from Communist China, to transit Tunisia. Bourguiba presumably is motivated by a number of factors, including disillusion with De Gaulle's Algerian policy, concern that the FLN might sabotage the newly opened oil pipeline from Saharan Algeria to the Tunisian coast, and even fear of an FLN-engineered assassination attempt.

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Congo: The Security Council's decision on 12 September to adjourn indefinitely its consideration of the Congo crisis will probably be viewed by Premier Lumumba as a victory over Secretary General Hammarskjold and may encourage him to attempt a new assault on UN-held installations in Leopoldville--the radio station and airfields. In the Congo capital, Lumumba continues to resist the efforts of President Kasavubu to remove him from office. Army units arrested the premier on 12 September under a warrant signed by Kasavubu and took him to a local army camp, but within a few hours the premier was back in Leopoldville. He toured the city and denounced the attempted coup against him. Meanwhile, the National Assembly backed the premier by cabling the UN not to recognize Justin Bomboko--Kasavubu's choice for new foreign minister. Lumumba also received support from the UAR when Cairo reportedly decided to withdraw its force of 515 men from the UN command in the Congo, charging the UN had violated Congo sovereignty. [redacted] (Page 5) no

LATE ITEM

*Laos: General Phoumi and Prince Boun Oum have sent emissaries to the king in Luang Prabang to explain the reasons for their rebellion against the Souvanna Phouma government. Their terms for a new compromise are said to include the formation of a new government under Boun Oum and the appointment of Phoumi as armed forces commander. They would "prefer" to retain Souvanna in the cabinet. Phoumi's designation as armed forces commander would probably be unacceptable to Captain Kong Le, whose paratroopers remain the dominant military force in the Vientiane area and who is thus in a position to veto any compromise worked out through the king. no

[redacted]
[redacted] Souvanna's claim that the Pathet Lao insurgents ceased all guerrilla activities on that date. The reported influx of refugees into Sam Neua town from insurgent-threatened outlying villages gives substance, moreover, to the Sam Neua commander's assertion that the situation in that strategic frontier province is becoming critical. [redacted]

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DAILY BRIEF

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USSR Apparently Making New Effort to Improve Relations
With Iran

The Soviet Union is apparently preparing a new attempt to resolve the impasse between it and Iran over Tehran's defense arrangements with the West in a manner which would undercut these ties and weaken Iran's close political cooperation with the United States and other Western powers.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Ambassador Pegov is arriving in Tehran about 14 September. His return at this time, after a "diplomatic" absence of about nine months, indicates that Moscow hopes to take advantage of the replacement of the staunchly anti-Communist Eqbal as Iranian prime minister to improve relations with Tehran. Last year, Pegov's return after an extended absence following the breakdown of negotiations for a nonaggression pact signaled Soviet efforts in September 1959 to obtain written guarantees from the Shah that Iran would not allow foreign military bases on Iranian territory.

Moscow has also modified its propaganda line on Iran. While the clandestine "National Voice of Iran" and the Tudeh party radiobroadcasts from East Berlin are continuing their criticism of the Shah and Iranian policies, Radio Moscow on 31 August halted its attacks on the Iranian ruler and instead began to blame Eqbal--the Shah's scapegoat over the election fiasco--for all differences with Iran. The Soviet press has also expressed optimism that the new Iranian Government will modify its policy toward the bloc.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] the immediate task of his government in the foreign policy field is to improve relations with the USSR, but asserted that this would not be done at the expense of Iran's ties with the West. He said that, as a step in this direction, Tehran had ceased its counter-propaganda aimed at blunting the Communist bloc's radio

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campaign against the Shah and his government. Other signs that Tehran intends to better its relations with Moscow include orders from the Shah in late August to Iranian security officials to let up on harassment of Soviet personnel and to show cooperation in issuing visas, travel permits, and other documentation. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The Iranian chargé in Moscow [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] delivered a letter from the Shah to Foreign Minister Gromyko, who said he would deliver it to its "destination"--presumably Khrushchev. The details of this letter have not been disclosed. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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~~SECRET~~Tunisian President Gives Firmer Support to Algerian Rebels

President Bourguiba, whose restrictions on National Liberation Front (FLN) activity in Tunisia have hampered rebel operations in Algeria, appears to be adopting a somewhat more permissive attitude toward the FLN. He reportedly stated recently that he might permit a convoy to cross Tunisia with much-needed arms and ammunition for the rebel army in Algeria. According to another report, he has agreed to allow "volunteers" from other countries--including any which might be sent from Communist China--to pass through Tunisia on their way to Algeria. He recently publicly reaffirmed his support for the FLN and sharply criticized France.

Bourguiba continues to be deeply concerned over the disruptive effects of the Algerian rebellion on North Africa in general and on Tunisia in particular. He is also faced with the immediate security problem engendered by the presence of an estimated 10,000 rebel troops within his country's borders. As a result, although he has publicly championed the rebel cause, he has sharply restricted the movement of troops and supplies within Tunisia. At the same time, he has attempted to act as a mediator between France and the FLN. His apparent shift toward closer identification with the FLN probably is motivated partly by disappointment with De Gaulle's Algerian policy and partly by concern that the FLN might sabotage the new oil pipeline from Saharan Algeria to the Tunisian coast. In addition, Bourguiba reportedly believes that the restrictions he has imposed on the FLN have made him an assassination target for the rebels, and he may be attempting to placate the Algerian leaders.

Bourguiba is also assisting in the rebel campaign to bring the Algerian dispute into international forums. He stated on 3 September that the Tunisians are ready "to join our fate with that of Algeria if this union would hasten the end of the war."

[redacted] have recently announced that their government and the provisional Algerian government are studying ways

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to achieve "an eventual organic and political fusion of Tunisia and Algeria." Such a move presumably would be designed to give the rebel government a certain amount of official standing during the forthcoming session of the UN General Assembly.

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~~TOP SECRET~~Situation in Congo

The Security Council's decision on 12 September to adjourn its consideration of the Congo crisis indefinitely will probably be viewed by Premier Lumumba as a victory over Secretary General Hammarskjold. The Security Council, however, may send a fact-finding subcommittee to the Congo with additional instructions to seek mediation between Lumumba and Kasavubu factions. The premier had asked that no resolution be passed because he feared that such action would strengthen Hammarskjold's hand in the Congo and restrict his own freedom of action against Katanga and moderates in the Congo. Lumumba now may be encouraged to attempt a new assault on UN-held installations in Leopoldville--the radio station and the airfields.

Although there have been indications that Kasavubu was improving his position, Premier Lumumba now appears to have regained some of the initiative. On 13 September, he repeated his threat to seek aid outside the UN. President Tshombé of Katanga has weakened Kasavubu's group--which he is considered to favor--by declaring for an independent Katanga and by refusing to accept the post of vice president in the new government. Hammarskjold is still convinced that he must break Lumumba and that he will be able to do it. He is prepared to turn down any Lumumba demand for UN withdrawal.


Premier Lumumba was arrested on 12 September on a warrant issued by Kasavubu, but was soon released, and toured Leopoldville boasting of the failure of the plot against him. On 12 September the National Assembly supported Lumumba when it cabled the Security Council, that "the Bomboko delegation is not recognized by the Parliament, and cannot be received by the Security Council or speak on behalf of the Congo." The premier has had strong support from the USSR, and has recently received backing from Ghana and the UAR. On 11 September Ghana condemned the government named by Kasavubu as "bogus" and declared it would be inadmissible for the UN to recognize it as the Congo government. On 12 September, Cairo radio announced


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that the UAR had decided to withdraw its 515-man contingent from the UN forces in the Congo rather than face the possibility of clashes with Congolese troops. On 7 September, the UAR chargé in Leopoldville suggested that Cairo reassure Lumumba of its complete readiness to respond to the Congolese government's request for military assistance, and ask Lumumba for specific information as to requirements. The assignment of a top official in the UAR foreign ministry--Dr. Murad Ghalib--as ambassador in Leopoldville may lead to a further strengthening of UAR influence in the Congo following his arrival expected on 13 September.

Two Soviet cargo vessels--the Voroshilov and the Krasnodar--are off the West African coast and may be heading for the Congo. On 11 September they were off Guinea and proceeding southward.

 the ships may be carrying arms or other clandestine cargo.

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Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

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Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

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Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

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